Lecture 18 - iOS Security
Plan

* App platform & ideas
* Secure Boot
* PIN-based encryption
  - Secure enclave
  - File encryption

Logistics

- Lab 4 code & theory due 11/18
- Drop date 11/18
- Midterm grades out
Today: Capstone lecture for platform security module.

We will look at the design of iPhone/iOS platform.

Goal: Understand how concepts we have seen in this module (isolation, software sourcing, secure boot) show up in a deployed system.
To kick off the discussion, let’s think about some of the security threats that Apple might consider when designing an iPhone.

SOFTWARE
- Malware app
  * steals your contacts
  * eavesdrops on your calls
  * steals your credit card data

PLATFORM
- Non-Apple OS gets loaded on your phone
  * Maybe to run non-Apple software
  * Maybe is malware
  * Maybe to avoid paying Apple 30% rev share

HARDWARE
- Malicious chips installed in factory
- Malicious chips installed en route to store
- People selling fake phones as real ones
- Someone steals your phone
  * gets secret data
  * authorizes txns on your behalf
- Non-Apple-authorized peripheral

[TRANSPORT
  *(Won't cover but also important!)* Phone call eavesdropping, etc.]
When you are learning about security defenses, good to remember:

* Some defenses are primarily there to protect HW vendor's business interests.
  
  e.g. DRM?

* Some defenses are primarily there to protect the user's interests (and indirectly Apple's)
  
  e.g. Encryption at rest?

* Sometimes, these interests are aligned.

* Sometimes, case is less clear.  (e.g. App store? Trusted boot?)
App Security

- Most secure computer/phone is one that doesn't have any data/apps on it & sits powered off.
  ↠ Not an option.

- Need to download & run software written by random people on the Internet. ⇒ Malware risk?

Openness

- To get on a standard iPhone, app has to get through review by Apple.
  ↠ Some limited checks for malware
  ↠ Also checks for biz reasons - in-app payments, (can't have app offering loan for APR >36% with repayment required ≤ 60 days,...)
  ❍ Epic suit
**iOS App Security**

- Once app is on the phone, it runs in an isolated sandbox
  
  * No shared files
  * Only communication via limited APIs (photos)

- App developer can request access to extra APIs when submitting to app store
  
  * Control VPN config
  * Query user's location on push notification
  * Get health data

Apple can try to limit API access to min necessary when app admitted to app store.

- Arguably these protections make it more difficult to get malware onto app store.
Still, what can go wrong?

At start of semester, Nikolai mentioned Xcode ghost

- Malicious version of Xcode dev tools posted on pub mirror in China
  (faster to download than true version in U.S.)

When developers compiled with malicious Xcode, app did ??

- App store review didn't catch this
  (though made it easier to clean up)

Is isolation is so good, why care?

- Can get UNID of device, lang, country
- R/W clipboard (password manager, cc#, ..)
  (could be very bad)
- Can open URL — try to phish user (?)

Can also steal user data more directly

- Fake TV, ..

Still, isolation buys a lot.
iOS Secure Boot

Goal: Make sure that Apple-signed OS kernel is running.

- Protects against persistent malware, people from installing custom/open OS on phone, someone from tampering of OS

Can't be updated

BootROM → pk apple

Low-level Bootloader

Kernel XNV

- BootROM checks sig on LLB, runs
- LLB checks sig on kernel, runs
- Failure = recovery mode

- Very similar to what Nikolai described w/ PS3
People "jailbreak" their iPhones... How?

- Bugs in BootRom and LLB could allow booting non-Apple OS

  - e.g. Cheekra1n
    - BootRom (burned into HW) code provides support for loading code via USB ("DFU mode")
      - e.g. if you really mess up OS & LLB code and can't boot

- Problem: Writing USB drivers is not so easy,

  iPhones w/ A9 chip have a UAF in BootRom

- Via USB, can trick phone into executing arbitrary OS w/o verifying signature.

  CAN'T UPDATE BootRom - Can't fix!

  But, doesn't persist across restarts.

  → Clever patch on more recent iPhones... maybe won't work to discuss later.

  → Patch later subverted.
Protecting data after phone theft

Settings:
- Phone grabbed in checked luggage
- Left in restaurant
- Taken by friend/partner

Goal: Attacker should “learn nothing” about data on phone?

- Contents of files hidden
- Probably lots of metadata leaked
  (# files on disk, etc.) - not sure
Threat: Someone takes your phone & wants to get the data off of it.

**Basic idea:** Encrypt all data w/ 128-bit AES key.

* Special hw AES engine for this.
* App processor never sees AES key, can't easily leak to OS or apps...

Even if you compromise OS, can't get raw keys. OS can't accidentally leak key.

But, where do we store AES key?

(Can't use 4-16 digit PIN as key... too short)
(Can't store key in normal flash)
Idea: Have special "secure enclave" that holds key — decrypts it only if user enters correct PIN.

Surprisingly challenging to do safely.

- Secure enclave is its own processor, also uses secureBoot
  + Uses measured boot (as in Srinis lecture) to derive secret encryption key that depends on OS being run — can't tamper w/ enclave OS & get data

- Secure enclave generates long-term secret VID on first boot & stores w/ fuses
  - Uses VID to encrypt files

- Enclave communicates w/ secure storage over enc channel (they have shared secret)

- Secure storage holds: - enc key for user data
  - Hashed passwd (hashed w/ VID)
  - Counter
PIN Auth w/ Sec enclave

1. User enters PIN.
2. iOS passes PIN to enclave
3. Enclave enforces timeout
4. Enclave passes hashed PIN to sec storage
5. Sec storage checks PIN
   - If correct: Return AES key, zero guess ctr
   - Else: Increment guess ctr
     - If too many guesses, erase key
6. Enclave passes AES key to AES engine (bypassing app processor)
7. App processor sends data to AES engine to be decrypted
Defeats many attacks:
- Brute Force ✗
- Replace secure enclave w/ backdoored one ✗
- Guess PIN & reboot ✗

→ Similar strategy to ensure erasure of other important pieces of data (CC#, FaceID, ...)
  Remote wipe of device

What about TouchID/Face ID?
- Always need PIN on reboot.
- Otherwise, keys stored in enclave.
- To make it harder to swap out TouchID sensor while device is running (ID seed in recorded fingerprint), enclave & ID sensor share a secret.

→ For max security, you’d power down device

→ Secure enclave & secure storage make PIN-based encryption much harder to break.
With checkra1n attack, user can exploit bug in app processor CPU to install any OS on app processor.

Recall: Apple can’t Patch BootRom on device

Clever idea: On newer phones (A10+), secure enclave detects when phone has booted in DFU mode (over USB) and panics on attempt to access user data.

Even if you can’t patch app proc, can patch enclave!

On A10, there’s a bug in enclave too that allows reading enclave memory.
Where could bugs remain?

- Kernel on app processor is big. **Bugs!**
- Even though it doesn't see AES keys, it sees lots of sensitive info (CCC#, PIN, passwords)
  - Many exploits
- Boot code on both processors may have bugs
- Could extract secrets using h/w attacks — probes, power analysis, etc. $$$
- Could steal secrets via "side-channel attacks"
  - Having separate AES engine likely makes stealing AES keys difficult
  - Still could steal secrets on device.
So far, we have discussed how to go from PIN \( \Rightarrow \) AES key.

- Substantial extra complexity.
  * Main file-system key (kept in efuseable stage)
  * "Class key" for type of protection
  * Each file encrypted with own key

- Different levels of protection ("class")
  - No R/W when locked (keys on lock)
  - Append when locked (sk wiped on lock, but pk left around)

  ❖ Useful for writing msg to user when phone locked
  ❖ Default for app data
  - R/W when booted
  - No protection (but still encrypted to allow remote wipe)
Recap:

- Sophisticated & expensive defenses to protect against seemingly esoteric threats.
- Isolation and crypto combined at many layers
  - One not so good w/o the other.
- Raises bar for attack.